Feminists Fail to Condemn Genocidal Sex-Selection Abortion

A new report shows that that India has aborted over 10 MILLION female fetuses based solely on their gender, and will abort up to 1 Million more each year unless something changes.  However, the illogically selfish and unbalanced pro-choice position forces most of its adherents to be unable to condemn this criminal genocide, or "foeticide."  As I've asked before in GATTACA Comes to Life, where does it stop?  Liberal theology is unable to manage this because it is faulty.

But it's not just liberal reasoning that is at fault - it's the value system of the Indian culture that devalues women.  We must encourage the promotion of equality and justice in such countries.  And we should continue to evangelize them as well.

1. India's misogynistic value system

'Asking me why I need a son, instead of a daughter, is like asking me why I have two eyes and not one,’ says one woman in the northern district of Haryana, who has just had an abortion after discovering that the baby she was carrying was female.

‘We see women who are beaten or abused by their husband and especially their mother-in-law for producing daughters. They are not considered worthy or dutiful daughters-in-law.’

A key reason for the woman’s compliance is the fear that they may be replaced by a younger, more fertile woman who will produce sons if they do not submit.

'I know women who have been persuaded to have multiple abortions and who feel absolutely rotten, but they have no choice — either abortion or divorce,’ says Sharma.

2.  This is not a new problem in India

The female shortfall is not a new problem in India. Even during the days of the Raj, and the first census in 1881, the British made efforts to eradicate female infanticide. But the problem of female foeticide is a new phenomenon fueled by advances in technology and the widespread liberal attitudes to abortion.

3.  What happens when you don't have enough women? 

The future is frightening. Over the next five years we could see more than a million foetuses eliminated every year,’ says Dr Sabu George, who has charted the problem. ‘At this pace we’ll soon have no girls born in the country. We don’t know where it will stop.’

Long-term worries are not simply the fear that such an imbalance will result in the rise of prostitution and sex trafficking. The danger to women’s emotional and physical health from repeated abortions is huge.

Sex-selective abortions are often performed later in the pregnancy and are therefore more dangerous. Only 20 per cent of all abortions conform to the provisions of Indian law and those performed outside hospital often result in complications that lead to the deaths of thousands of women.

4. What can liberal or feminist values do?

Feminists believe that until Indian society begins to value women, no amount of laws will help.

‘Until women take control of their own lives and refuse to give in to pressure, nothing will change,’ says Rasil Basu, who has made a film about the crisis called Vanishing Daughters. ‘Empowerment of women is the only answer.’

The best argument liberal feminists can make is that India should change the culture so that women have freedom of choice.  If women WANT to have girls, they should not be socially punished or frowned upon for doing so.   Yet, if a woman decides she doesn't want a girl, this type of feminism still allows her to make that hideous choice. 

Can liberals actually muster a position that prohibits ANY kind of abortion, and be of use in fighting this unrighteousness?  I doubt it.  Their ideology prevents them because they assign no value to the unborn, and supreme value to the woman making the choice. 

5. The abject failure of liberal logic on abortion

What if we find a homosexual genetic marker?  Can people abort potentially gay fetuses?  Is that their right to do so, or are we doing something immoral?   What about growing a fetus to about 5 months in order to harvest its bone marrow or organs, then throwing it away?  I mean, if it's not a person, and just part of the woman's body just like one of her organs, why not? 

The most rational, reasonable, ethical, and moral position is that we must legally give the fetus the status and rights of a person at some point BEFORE birth, either at conception, as many conservatives reason, or at some time soon after, as I have argued at c-ral.org.   To conclude otherwise is intellectually, morally, objectively, and ethically wrong.

6. A biblical view, interpreted through many of the gains of modern feminism, is what they need.

I am not a theological liberal, but overly paternalistic interpretations of scripture are as bad as those that try to justify slavery from scripture.  Sad to say for Christianity, it did not lead in the woman's suffrage or feminist movements (though it did in abolition of slavery).  However, there are such things as Christian Feminists, and Feminists for Life.  Here are some relevant scriptures as well.

Exodus 21:22-25
"If men who are fighting hit a pregnant woman and she gives birth prematurely but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the woman's husband demands and the court allows. But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,  burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

Psalm 127:2
Sons are a heritage from the LORD, children a reward from him.

Malachi 2:16
"I hate divorce," says the LORD God of Israel

Ephesians 5:22-33
Wives, submit to your husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior. Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything.

Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself.

After all, no one ever hated his own body, but he feeds and cares for it, just as Christ does the church— for we are members of his body. "For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh." This is a profound mystery—but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband.

1 Corinthians 7:3-11
The husband should fulfill his marital duty to his wife, and likewise the wife to her husband. The wife's body does not belong to her alone but also to her husband. In the same way, the husband's body does not belong to him alone but also to his wife. Do not deprive each other except by mutual consent and for a time, so that you may devote yourselves to prayer. Then come together again so that Satan will not tempt you because of your lack of self-control.

I say this as a concession, not as a command. I wish that all men were as I am. But each man has his own gift from God; one has this gift, another has that.

Now to the unmarried and the widows I say: It is good for them to stay unmarried, as I am. But if they cannot control themselves, they should marry, for it is better to marry than to burn with passion.

To the married I give this command (not I, but the Lord): A wife must not separate from her husband. But if she does, she must remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband. And a husband must not divorce his wife.

Comments

[Cineaste]

It's India's culture that is causeing the problem, not their freedom to choose. There is a perception there that boys have greater value than girls. If you want to drill down past the cultural issues to "Should abortion be permissible?" read the article below...

The Supposed Rights of the Fetus

by

Russell Blackford

(first published 2002 in Quadrant magazine)

Issues arising from actual or proposed scientific research on human embryos have introduced a renewed urgency to the long-running public policy debate about the moral rights of human zygotes, embryos and fetuses. The debate inevitably provokes participants to make familiar claims about the ethical acceptability or otherwise of abortion, since the arguments about abortion and embryo research share some of the same logic.

Underlying issues relating to potentiality arise in all these arguments, though they can be brought out most clearly in a discussion of abortion, where there is a deliberate intention to end the development of a living organism that is clearly human (in the sense of its species membership). Furthermore, arguments based on the developmental potential of a zygote, embryo or fetus have been developed in their most sophisticated form in the context of the abortion debate.

I propose to revisit the implications of fetal potentiality—the potential for a fetus to become a fully-developed human being—for the ethical permissibility of abortion. Except where specific distinctions need to be made, I will use the word "fetus" somewhat loosely, to refer to all stages of development from fertilisation to immediately before birth. I will argue that abortion does not violate any interest of the fetus that we are ethically obliged to respect. This does not rule out the possibility that some kinds of abortions are ethically impermissible for other reasons. For example, it might well be ethically impermissible for a woman to have a very late abortion, or to decide on an abortion purely because of the sex of the fetus. If so, however, the source of this impermissibility must be found elsewhere than in the mere fact that the fetus is a potential person or that it has some interest that is entailed by its potentiality.

If we reject arguments based on potentiality in the context of the abortion debate, it follows that we must also reject them in the context of debate over research on embryonic stem cells, or other research involving the destruction of human embryos. Indeed, there are broad implications for public policy in respect of contentious bioethical issues.

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The most sophisticated arguments that fetal potentiality does matter may be those developed by Jim Stone in two well-known articles published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, in 1987 and 1994 respectively: "Why Potentiality Matters" and "Why Potentiality Still Matters." In arguing that a fetus has serious interests that are harmed if it is aborted, Stone suggests that it has an interest in completing its normal developmental path in growing to become a human adult. To prevent this from happening is to inflict a serious and ethically impermissible harm on the fetus.

Stone suggests, with some reason, that "it is time we quit attacking straw men", i.e. defending abortion by attacking unsophisticated concepts of potentiality. Clearly, it is desirable that anti-abortion arguments based on fetal potentiality be examined at their strongest, especially since such arguments have implications for other aspects of public policy in the field of bioethics. Accordingly, I have structured this article around Stone's argument and concepts. This provides a degree of focus and unity, while also ensuring that the concept of potentiality under discussion is one designed to avoid obvious absurdities.

Stone acknowledges that a fetus's mental and physical capacities are inferior not only to those of a human adult, but also to those of many adult non-human animals. It follows, in his view, that no obligation arises from any ethically significant physical or mental capacities that a fetus possesses. He suggests that any strong ethical claim to protection that can be made on behalf of a fetus must appeal to its potential to grow and develop into an adult human being, "for nothing else can justify it."

I follow Stone in accepting the uncontroversial point that no fetus has such capacities as those for self-awareness, reason and reflection. However, without additional argument, it is far from clear that nothing else whatsoever, apart from potentiality, can justify ethical restraints on how we treat a fetus. There might be other sources of ethical standards according to which abortion is impermissible.

For example, there might be important utilitarian considerations to take into account before we simply treat fetuses however we like, such as adverse social consequences that might flow if abortion became very common. In principle, this might justify an ethical rule against abortions. Again, Stone assumes that the mere fact that a human fetus belongs to our particular species is ethically irrelevant, but this is not clearly so. As recognised in antiquity by the much-maligned Greek sophist Protagoras, one source of our ethical standards might be the need for human beings to distinguish themselves from and compete successfully with other species, in order to survive. If that is so, there is a broadly consequentialist justification for a rule against harming beings of our own species.

Accordingly, no assumption should be made that potentiality is the only consideration that could justify an ethical standard against which abortion is impermissible. Still, it is difficult to identify other considerations strong enough to rule out early abortions (or, indeed, embryo experimentation). The point made by Protagoras, and discussed more recently by the philosopher J.L. Mackie, would not seem to have application to an early fetus that has received minimal, if any, social recognition and familial investment.

Stone introduces the idea of "strong potentiality", arguing that a fetus is, in a strong sense, "a potential adult human being". Since he believes that no ethical right to life is entailed merely by membership of the species homo sapiens, he poses the central question as: "When and in virtue of what do members of the species homo sapiens … acquire a right to life?" In answering that question, he emphasises that certain "goods" are typically enjoyed by adult human beings, including self-awareness, social interaction, and the possibility of moral stature. The argument is that a fetus has the capacity to develop into a being which is capable of enjoying these goods, and that this is prevented by abortion.

Stone's concept of a person, borrowed from John Locke, is that of a being which has "reason, reflection and self-awareness". Stone sees adult human beings as typically possessing those characteristics, and thus being persons. These characteristics are closely linked to the goods that he sees a fetus as being deprived of if it is aborted, and therefore prevented from developing into a human adult. Stone's argument, then, can be revised, without any material distortion, along the lines that to abort a fetus is to frustrate its potential to develop into a person and enjoy goods typically available to persons living socially with other persons.

The plausibility of the argument depends on distinguishing two senses in which we might claim that A is a potential B. The first, "weak", sense requires only that A is a causal element in the production of the relevant B and that the physical matter of A will be, or will help produce, that of the B. In this sense, a human sperm cell is a potential adult human, and thus a potential person. However, it appears absurd to suggest that any serious wrong is committed if a sperm cell is destroyed. Thus Stone requires a more restricted concept of potentiality.

The "strong" sense of potentiality developed by Stone adds an additional requirement that "A will produce a B if A develops normally and the B so produced will be such that it once was A." In other words, A will, "normally", become a B. In developing a similar concept of potentiality, Stephen Buckle has explained the idea of "becoming" along the lines that, if A develops and becomes a B, then A's identity is preserved.

For Stone, a fetus has a strong potentiality to become a person. If it develops normally, it will become a person that was the fetus. Since he considers strong potentiality to be ethically significant, this "establishes the fetus's right to life", even though an ovum or a sperm cell has no rights at all, since neither, by itself, can become a person. Much of Stone's argument is spent in attempting to show that no absurdities follow from seeing the potentiality of a fetus as morally significant, since such things as sperm cells, eggs, and systems of sperm cells and eggs that have not yet been united possess only weak potentiality.

However, Stone's definition of strong potentiality also requires a concept of what counts as "normal development". He defines this in terms of an entity having a nature of such a kind as to determine a developmental path. In the case of biological entities such as a fetuses, he refines this further. Such an entity "develops normally if it follows to the end the developmental path primarily determined by its nature which leads to the adult stage of members of its kind."

One way of responding to the argument is to test the coherence of this idea of "normal" development. In a reply to Stone's first (1987) article, also published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, John Andrew Fisher argued that a fetus can take various developmental paths, at least in principle, so we cannot identify one path as normal. Stone, however, has clarified what he sees as "normal" development in this context. He proposes that identity is maintained if there is no genetic alteration, or only a minor one, and any developmental path that follows from the genetic code of an animal can be considered normal.

As explained by Stone, the physical organisation of an entity such as a fetus, particularly its genetic code, reveals what can be considered normal for its development. An entity's nature and its normal path of development are to be understood in terms of what might be called the entity's functional "design", which might, of course, arise from evolutionary processes, not from the deliberate actions of any intelligent designer (we can use the expression "quasi-design"). This does, indeed, appear to be a coherent account of "normal" development, imposing an intuitively comprehensible natural restriction on what kinds of potentiality can be considered "strong".

#

Stone argues that strong potentiality is ethically significant in the case of a fetus because the actualisation of its nature will benefit it, in so far as it will enjoy such goods as self-awareness, social interactions, and the possibility of moral stature. In short, it has an interest in growing up.

From this, he suggests that a fetus has a right to receive care and protection:

I submit that we have a prima facie duty to all creatures not to deprive them of the conscious goods which it is their nature to realize. As the good grows greater, our duty grows stronger and harder to override. Self-awareness, I believe, is greater than mere sentience; hence we have a powerful duty to protect and care for human infants as well as the infants of any species the adult members of which have self-awareness.

In this respect, a fetus's right to life is derived in the same way as that of a baby which has actually been born: an "infant". In each case, the right to life is merely the corollary of our supposed ethical obligation to care for it, protect it, and assist its development to personhood. Speaking of infants, but insisting that exactly the same argument applies to a fetus, Stone argues that we owe them "care and protection because death harms them terribly" by depriving them of goods such as self-awareness.

Conversely, Stone argues, weak potentiality does not matter, ethically, because if a first creature does not become a second creature, but merely produces it in some other way, "that first creature has no conscious good of its own, hence no welfare or rights." This provides an explanation as to why his contentions about strong potentiality do not flow over into weak potentiality, which could have absurd results.

One way to test the sophistication and persuasiveness of this argument is to examine how well it fares against arguments that it is permissible to destroy potential persons. In his celebrated (or perhaps notorious) study, Abortion and Infanticide (1983), Michael Tooley discusses six such arguments, four of which he considers successful. These arguments were not devised to answer Stone's specific argument, but they are sufficiently comprehensive to give an indication of how successful Stone's argument is in avoiding obvious rebuttals or absurd consequences. I will consider them in order.

1. "Reprogramming" persons

First, Tooley discusses the argument that it would be ethically impermissible to "reprogram" an actual person by giving the person a new set of "beliefs, attitudes and personality traits". In the case of a human being, this would presumably require extensive neurophysiological alterations. Tooley suggests that it is not wrong to carry out such reprogramming at the potential person stage. The argument concludes that the best explanation for this difference may be "simply that it is not wrong to destroy potential persons".

Tooley does not believe that this argument succeeds, since it does not eliminate the possibility that it is wrong to destroy potential persons simply because they are intrinsically valuable entities. In any event, the argument is ineffective against Stone's line of argument for another reason, which Tooley does not identify.

On Stone's account, the kind of loss that a potential person suffers when it is destroyed is different from the kind of loss that a person suffers from being "reprogrammed". Presumably, the reprogrammed person suffers a loss of psychic integration, access to lived experience, and similar goods—losses that a potential person cannot suffer. However the potential person suffers a different loss: the opportunity to have any self-awareness at all. It is not surprising that different kinds of losses can be inflicted on persons from those that can be inflicted on potential persons, and Stone offers a plausible account of what kind of loss can be suffered by the latter.

2. Cloning the space explorer

Tooley next considers an argument advanced by Mary Warren in which we are invited to imagine that a space explorer is captured by aliens who propose to create hundreds of thousands of human beings from the cells of his body, destroying him in the process. Our intuition is that the space explorer is entitled to escape from this situation, though it means that many persons fail to come into being.

Tooley does not think that this argument is effective as it stands because a conservative could deny that human cells are potential persons, even if some science fictional technology could be used to develop them into persons (as might indeed be the case if cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer were perfected). Indeed, Stone restricts his criteria for strong potential personhood quite closely; in particular it involves some kind of functional design, or evolutionary quasi-design.

As Tooley puts it, Warren would need to employ a further premise: that there is "no morally significant interpretation of 'potential' according to which human foetuses, but not human cells, are potential persons." A philosopher such as Stone, writing broadly in the natural law tradition, could reject that premise. Stone has a coherent concept of strong potentiality that would not be instanciated by a somatic cell, even if technologies such as reproductive cloning became available.

3. The unrestricted potentiality principle

Tooley argues that it is necessary to base the argument against destroying a potential person on a wider principle which he calls "The Unrestricted Potentiality Principle". It is worth considering his formulation of this, because it can then be compared with Stone's concept of strong potentiality:

The destruction of a potential person is intrinsically wrong, and seriously so, where X is a potential person if and only if X is an entity, or system of entities, that has all, or almost all of the properties of a positive sort that together would be causally sufficient to bring it about that X gives rise to a person, and where there are no factors present within X that would block the causal process in question.

He argues that we are required to adopt such a broad principle because it cannot be relevant whether or not the entity in question is biological, so long as it is capable of giving rise to a person. Furthermore, it is possible that a person could be a system of entities, rather than a single entity, or that a system of entities could rise to it. Accordingly, a potential person might be a system with spatially separated parts.

All these points should be granted to Tooley. Perhaps it is possible that a sufficiently complex, intricately connected non-biological entity or system could become conscious and self-aware. Thus the principle is correctly expressed in a general form to apply to non-biological entities and to systems of entities.

While this is persuasive, Tooley's formulation of the principle is wider than any which Stone's argument requires. For Stone, it is important that A is organised in such a way that it has the potential to become a B, not merely "give rise" to it. Thus, counter-examples to the principle enunciated by Tooley do not necessarily refute Stone's argument.

For example, Tooley discusses the case of a machine which contains a sperm and an ovum, and has the capacity to fertilise the ovum, then nourish the resulting being. Imagine the machine has started, but fertilisation has not yet occurred. Tooley suggests that few people would consider interfering with the machine to be seriously wrong. However, Stone could reply that this example contains no entity, or system of entities, that has been wronged in the sense that it has been deprived of the opportunity of growing into personhood. In this example, neither the total system, the machine, nor the individual sperm or ovum has the capacity to become a person.

While Stone's argument about fetal potentiality depends upon a principle that cannot be restricted to non-biological entities and to systems of entities, it is legitimately restricted to those entities and systems that can actually become persons because of their functional design, or quasi-design. Any counter-examples must be framed consistently with that restriction.

4. Almost active potentialities

Tooley notes that we must speak of an entity or system that is a potential person "having all, or almost all, of the properties that are causally sufficient", since a human fetus cannot, by itself, become a person. He then offers the counter-example of a woman and a collection of sperm as a system that is capable of giving rise to a person, though the system could be destroyed by spermicide. But, Tooley says, it seems absurd to suggest that the use of spermicide involves any serious wrong.

Again, this is not a counter-example to Stone's line of argument, since it postulates no entity or system of entities that could ever become a person. Tooley is correct that a conservative argument must use principles broad enough to deal with an entity, or a system of entities, that might require something further, such as some kind of care, if it is to become a person. But Stone's argument cannot be invalidated by counter-examples in which no entity or system is prevented, if deprived of care, from developing into a person.

5. The moral symmetry argument and the responsibility to produce persons

Tooley devotes most of his analysis to an argument based on "moral symmetry", the principle that there is no ethical significance in the mere distinction between acts and omissions. He argues that this principle entails that the destruction of a fetus is prima facie no more seriously wrong than intentionally refraining from fertilising a human ovum. Accordingly, if destroying a fetus is seriously wrong, so is intentionally refraining from fertilising an ovum. But that conclusion would be seen by most people as absurd.

However, even if the principle of moral symmetry is accepted, Stone's argument remains unscathed. Stone argues that there is an independent principle that we not harm the interest of a potential person in becoming a person. If this is accepted, it is significant that, where we simply refrain from creating a potential person at all, there is never an entity whose interests are harmed. On Stone's account, the ethical equivalent of killing a potential person would be allowing it to die, not simply refraining from procreation.

6. Moral comparability principles

Finally, Tooley argues that we can derive strong ethical conclusions even if we adopt various principles related to the moral symmetry principle, though weaker than it. However, such arguments again assume that there is no independent principle that we not harm the interests of a potential person by denying it personhood. Against the argument advanced by Stone, this sixth argument also fails.

#

Consideration of the arguments advanced by Tooley suggests that Stone's arguments and concepts do not involve obvious absurdities and are not open to easy refutation. However, Stone's case succeeds only if we accept the general principle that it is ethically impermissible to deny assistance to any entity, biological or otherwise, or any system of entities, that is functionally organised to become a person and enjoy associated goods such as self-awareness.

It is not obvious that we should accept such a principle. Indeed, the principle faces serious difficulties, which can be seen when we consider a claim made by Feinberg, which Stone attempts to refute:

Without awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim, and purpose, a being can have no interests; without interests he cannot be benefited; without the capacity to be a beneficiary, he can have no rights.

Here, Feinberg denies that an insentient potential person has interests at all. Furthermore, even if Feinberg is wrong in this respect, and there is something that can, with all propriety, be called an "interest" in having the opportunity to become a person, where does this get us? What is the source of our ethical obligation to respect and further this particular kind of interest?

Stone believes that such an interest must exist and must be ethically significant. His argument depends on the fact that, like the unborn, the newborn have very undeveloped mental and physical capacities. If the interest does not exist, he says, "we cannot harm a baby by killing her painlessly", a proposition that he considers counter-intuitive. If our intuition is justified, so he argues, a potential person not only has an interest in growing into a person; that interest must also be one which gives it a right that we respond in certain ways.

The difficulty with this argument is that it appeals to our strong intuition that it is ethically impermissible to kill a baby, while falsely suggesting that the source of the impermissibility must be the baby's interests and rights.

There is no universal intuition, across human societies, that a newborn baby, much less a fetus, has interests, rights or ethical entitlements. It does seem that all human societies accept that, once a child is born it is morally wrong to kill or injure it, at least once a certain time has elapsed and it is on the path to adulthood. But that is not because it is seen as holder of ethical rights. Since this attitude is manifested even in societies that practice infanticide, its explanation is likely to be the instinctive bonding of parents with children, the significance accorded to a new member entering into the community, and the community's hopes for its future, which are literally and symbolically bound up with the birth of children. As Mary Warren and others have suggested, the importance of these considerations is a more likely source of ethical standards in respect of the treatment of very young children.

Furthermore, it is implausible that the source of ethical obligations towards children in our own society is a principle that potential persons have rights. Paul Gomberg has pointed out that our society appears to recognise a separate set of ethical standards relating to our duties to our offspring, which he calls the morality of nurturance. Its "central norm" is a duty imposed on parents "to nurture their offspring, to provide them with sustenance and guidance until they reach self-sufficiency."

The difficulty this poses for Stone is that widely-acknowledged ethical standards associated with nurturance appear capable of distinguishing an increasing responsibility to care for a fetus as it develops in the womb. However, this is inconsistent with Stone's belief that any potential person suffers the same loss if it is destroyed before it reaches personhood. It appears that, at least for many people in our society, the source of ethical standards in how they treat children (including during pregnancy) is actually inconsistent with Stone's account.

Stone might, of course, argue that such nuanced ethical standards are simply wrong, but nothing he says addresses this. Their existence makes it less likely that his own account of fetal interests and rights and rights is required to provide a basis for common intuitions about the impermissibility of harming a baby, or even a fetus at a late stage of development. Accordingly, consideration of the standards recognised by our own society, and by human societies in general, suggests that Stone is left without another example, other than the situation of a fetus, to support his view that potential persons, as such, have interests which we are ethically obliged to respect. He is forced to generalise from a class of one member—and the very class that is controversial.

Furthermore, even if potential persons were recognised as having an interest in attaining personhood, it is not clear why that interest should impose an obligation that we further it. It is at least as intuitively plausible to suggest that we are ethically permitted to live our own lives and that this includes pursuing our own interests, even at the expense of the interests of others, unless there is some sound reason why we should be restrained from doing so.

In principle, there may be a variety of such reasons that we might recognise as requiring us to restrain the purely selfish pursuit of our own interests. However, it is not clear what reason could apply in this case. Even if we speak of a fetus, or another potential person, as having an interest in becoming a person, exactly what harm does it suffer if the interest is not met?

It cannot experience any frustration of its desires, because it has no desires. The mere failure to meet this interest does not inflict any pain. It does not experience fear, so the wrongfulness of our action cannot consist in inflicting upon a entity something that it fears. Nor has it begun a life whose coherence or value may be ruined by being cut short. We do not reveal ourselves as cruel if we terminate the development of a merely potential person painlessly, or with minimal pain. It is difficult, in short, to see why the interest is one that must command our respect. It seems to be a totally theoretical interest. It might unkindly be called a contrived one.

Since there are no real-life situations that are closely analogous to abortion, we are forced to think of imaginary examples, but these do not seem to assist Stone. For example, we could imagine that a powerful computer has been developed, and has been programmed in such a way that it will continually upgrade itself and eventually reach self-awareness. Are we now under an ethical obligation to provide it with electrical power until such a time as it becomes self-aware? Perhaps we must ascribe to the computer a right to continue in existence, without being reprogrammed, once it has become a person, but it is not obvious that we are ethically obliged to supply it with a continuous source of electricity prior to that point.

Yet this device seems to have a "nature" in an analogous sense to the genetic program of a fetus. Unless specifically religious considerations are introduced, or some kind of quasi-religious significance is imputed to functional "design" arising from biological evolution, the situations of the fetus and the advanced computer cannot be distinguished. There is, of course, no typical outcome here, if the computer is one of a kind, but this does not seem to matter if it otherwise has all the features of strong potentiality for personhood. Furthermore, we can alter the thought experiment to imagine a world where such devices are commonplace, so we can speak sensibly of a typical adult member of its kind.

Many people shy away from such science fictional examples, but they are a useful way to examine the underlying logic of ethical arguments and isolate our intuitions on precise issues. The important point here, however, is not so much that the science fictional scenario is a counter-example to Stone's argument. It is that he does not have an example at all on which to base his exhortation that we adopt a strong potentiality principle. An attempt to find examples merely shows that they are: (1) rather far-fetched (if that matters); and (2) not supportive of Stone's intuitions. It is difficult to imagine any example that supports his intuitions, unless we are prepared to argue from analogy with human abortion, which is exactly the action whose ethical permissibility is in question.

Thus, Stone's argument against abortion, based on the strong potentiality principle, is either ultimately groundless or circular.

In conclusion, a coherent account can be given of a kind of potentiality for personhood that is possessed by a fetus and is not possessed by other entities such as sperm cells, ova, and somatic cells, by women who have had sexual intercourse, or by science fictional devices that might lead to the creation of an adult human being. It can then be argued that this kind of "strong potentiality" has an ethical significance, without leading to the absurdity of ascribing ethical significance to other kinds of potentiality, such as that possessed by a sperm cell.

Such an argument resists many of the typical counter-arguments directed at potentiality as an ethical consideration in the abortion debate. However, it requires that we ascribe interests to entities that are unable to suffer any pain or frustration if their so-called interests are not met. Even if an interest of that kind can be recognised at all, a further argument is required as to why it is one that should be respected and furthered, imposing an ethical restriction on our self-regarding conduct.

It appears that no such argument is available. An ethical rule to the effect that such interests must be furthered cannot be found by generalising from other cases, for no other real-world cases are salient. The case of infanticide (or even that of late-term abortion) is easily distinguishable. Consideration of science fictional cases does not advance the argument any further. Accordingly, although a coherent account of "strong potentiality" can be developed along the lines suggested by Stone, it does not adequately ground an argument against abortion. Arguments against abortion, or against certain kinds of abortions, need to be based on some other source of ethical standards than moral rights that are supposedly entailed by potential personhood.

Accordingly, arguments based on strong potentiality fail when deployed in the abortion debate. For precisely the same reasons, they must fail in any public policy debate in the field of bioethics, when legislative prohibitions are urged, based upon the supposed rights of zygotes or embryos. The implications for the current debate about stem cell research are obvious. When rational analysis is applied to the strongest arguments put by conservatives against harming such entities as human embryos, the arguments fall apart.

Thinkers in the natural law tradition may be able to follow Stone in strengthening their ideas with concepts of functional quasi-design taken over from the field of evolutionary biology. They may be able to persuade some others to abstain voluntarily from practices such as abortion and stem cell research on human embryos, but the moral principles relied upon are not universally accepted. Nor is there any rationally compelling basis why they should be, or why they can legitimately be imposed upon society as a whole. It is time to reject those arguments once and for all as a basis for setting public policy in the field of bioethics.

The Supposed Rights of the Fetus

[Sam Wilkinson]

The clear issue is that women should be free to choose, meaning that Indian society must slowly change. I think we would all agree that non-preferred gender is a horrible reason for an abortion, including me. That said, it isn't a good enough reason to ban abortion. I assume that the inplied logic here is that because this horrible practice occurs, all abortion should be banned. I don't believe that this logically follows however.

[seeker]

That said, it isn't a good enough reason to ban abortion. I assume that the inplied logic here is that because this horrible practice occurs, all abortion should be banned. I don't believe that this logically follows however.

Yes, as I said, liberals think it is bad because women are being denied choice, not because the fetus has value or rights that trump the mother's. While I agree that the culture needs to change, in this case, just like liberals are pushing for "rights" for gays, whose suffering is limited compared to the death of the fetus, they should be pushing for legislation to protect the unborn child's rights.

But according to them, the unborn child has no rights until the day it is born. Unbelievably naive and willingly blind, imo.

[Cineaste]

But according to them, the unborn child has no rights until the day it is born. Unbelievably naive and willingly blind, imo.

The article addresses this pro life misconception of pro choice.

[Sam Wilkinson]

Seeker,

1. You're seriously arguing that fetal rights should TRUMP parental rights? A woman who will die as a result of her pregnancy must have the child anyway? Seriously?

2. Do fetuses actually suffer? Or do you suffer thinking about fetuses? There's a big difference...

3. Finally, gay rights have absolutely nothing to do with fetuses. You know that. Stop even trying to connect the two. Or, if you are going to play that card, perhaps we ought to observe that what you're demanding for all fetuses are rights that are exactly the same. Meanwhile, you argue that gays should be treated as second class citizens with second class rights, in this great country of ours. You can argue for total equality, or you can't, but you can't accuse me of doing something that you yourself are doing.

[seeker]

You're seriously arguing that fetal rights should TRUMP parental rights? A woman who will die as a result of her pregnancy must have the child anyway? Seriously?
Actually, most women who have abortions aren't in mortal danger if they deliver. For the women who's life is at risk, of course we should protect their right to save their own life.

However, the child's right to life most certainly should trump the woman's right to choose, just as it does with regard to infanticide. That's the basic pro-life position.

Do fetuses actually suffer? Or do you suffer thinking about fetuses?
That question is relevant. I think this has been approached two ways - one is to say that it doesn't matter, because even if they do not suffer, or are made to not suffer by, say, anesthesia, it still amounts to killing an innocent person with rights. The ability to suffer is not, it is argued, the best argument for the personhood, or ethical measurement of exterminating, the fetus. So suffering does not determine if they have rights - only the fact that they are considered a person, by a greater or other set of criteria, matters. I agree with this, in that if they have a heartbeat and brainwaves, and perhaps additionally, are able to widthdraw from negative stimuli, that is a good enough argument that they respond to what amounts to pain, and should be protected by law.

The second argument is that unless they have the ability to *consciously* experience pain, which one study pegs at between 24 and 27 weeks, they really aren't suffering even if they have the appearance of suffering before that point. By this argument, abortions after 27 weeks are bad, and before are OK.

While I think this is certainly a great argument against late term abortions, I don't think that the ability to consciously process pain is the only argument we can make in favor of the fetus, nor of it's value or personhood.

Finally, gay rights have absolutely nothing to do with fetuses.
Here's where they overlap. Let's say that we discover some gene or marker that indicates a greater possibility of a child being gay. Are you OK with parents selectively aborting such children, the way that we currently abort 90% of Down's Sydrome children in America, or the way that they abort 1 MILLION female unborn children each year in India? Or would you call it HOMOSEXUAL GENOCIDE? I would call it genocide and infanticide. And that's what I call the most other types of abortion we do today.

[Sam Wilkinson]

1. I know that most women aren't in mortal danger. I thought that you were saying that the life of a fetus should trump that of a mother. I think that logic is quite faulty, although there are clearly some in this country who decidely believe that mothers should receive zero protection. Those people are total lunatics, for the record.

2. I'll offer you a trade: women are allowed to have abortions until the middle of the SECOND trimester, but none after (unless they're in mortal danger). However, your side has to promise to never again bring up the issue, as well as to give up on legal protections for pharmacists who refuse morning after prescriptions, as well as allow for the dissemination of birth control. Fair enough?

3. I think it is quite clear that the attitude of many Christians would change if a gay gene were discovered. I think we would see an embrace of abortion by all of those Christian leaders who themselves have gay children. However, if they do find this gay gene (which I bet they will, at some point), you'll then have to acknowledge that homosexuality is not a choice, which means you'll have to abandon your second class citizenship demand for gays.

More importantly, I think we need to revisit the issue of choice: abortion for sex selection strikes us as offensive. What of abortion for a child certain to die immediately after birth? What of abortion to prevent Down's Syndrome? I don't have any answers here, I'm just wondering. And yes, Aaron, we know your position already. But it seems like never being born is the more sensible course, just as staying alive wasn't the most sensible course for Terri Schiavo.

[seeker]

I thought that you were saying that the life of a fetus should trump that of a mother. I think that logic is quite faulty, although there are clearly some in this country who decidely believe that mothers should receive zero protection. Those people are total lunatics, for the record.

Very few pro-life people believe that we should make abortion illegal if the mother's life is at stake. However, when her life is not at risk, most pro-lifers are against abortion from the point of conception on. While I agree that life *may* begin that early, I would like to legislate something a bit less stringent, because I think the "heartbeat/brainwave" marker is more defensible, and allows people to exercise their own conscience and rights before that point.

I'll offer you a trade: women are allowed to have abortions until the middle of the SECOND trimester, but none after
No deal, that's too late. I'm shooting for midway in the first trimester as a "compromise" that protects the child while giving some leeway for those who want to preserve choice.

I think it is quite clear that the attitude of many Christians would change if a gay gene were discovered. I think we would see an embrace of abortion by all of those Christian leaders who themselves have gay children.
I don't think that would be the majority opinion at all. What you would see are two things - many xians would begin to acccept homosexuality as normative because of the existence of some biological factors in homosexuality (which I have previously argued does NOT make it "natural" any more than genetic predisposition for other personality disorders).

Secondly, most Christians would say that this marker does not determine sexuality, it merely shows a predisposition, and therefore, the child could be hetero. And they would also conclude that, like a child born with Down's syndrome, we don't have the right to kill them just because we don't want to be inconvenienced.

I highly doubt that a genetic "gay marker" would sway many Christians towards abortion - only the Fred Phelps types, perhaps. Despite their sometimes poor efforts at compassion, Xians are serious about loving people and hating sin - and in this case, the potentially gay fetus is a person, and the sin is not homosexuality (esp. since the fetus has practiced no sex, and may in fact not be gay) - the sin is abortion.

[Sam Wilkinson]

Christians are only occaisonally serious about loving people and hating sin. Much more often, Christians hate people and hate sin. You can argue any way that you want, but the evidence clearly shows that Christians tend toward intolerance, toward hatred, toward disdain for those different from them.

As for abortion, if you think you're preserving choice by giving women six weeks, you're mistaken. And the bigger point is that Christians won't stop at whatever arbitrary date is set - they'll stop when law reflects only their own position, everybody else be damned. And that's the problem. There seems to be no wiggle room for people. Look at Aaron and his wife; they passionate believe that they should be able to tell my girlfriend what to do with her body. That takes guts. Pro-lifers genuinely believe that they have the right to force others into their beliefs.

[seeker]

As for abortion, if you think you're preserving choice by giving women six weeks, you're mistaken.
This gives them the choice of using the day after pill. While you are correct that 6 weeks isn't much, it's enough to turn a blob of cells into a fetus with a heartbeat.

And the bigger point is that Christians won't stop at whatever arbitrary date is set - they'll stop when law reflects only their own position, everybody else be damned.
Well, that's where moderates like me come in ;).

Look at Aaron and his wife; they passionate believe that they should be able to tell my girlfriend what to do with her body.

Actually, i think I've won Aaron over to my side. And technically speaking, Aaron is not trying to tell you what to do with your girlfriend's body, but with the body of the unborn child, which is not just her property like some black slave. It is a helpless person with rights that you want to take away for selfish reasons. That takes guts.

Pro-lifers genuinely believe that they have the right to force others into their beliefs.
Yes, just like those damned abolishonists.

[Sam Wilkinson]

Seeker,

You made my perfect point for me when you wrote "Aaron is not trying to tell you what to do with your girlfriend's body." Her body isn't MINE to do anything with. It is hers, and she is free to make whatever decision she feels is right. This sort of thing offends (some) Christians, because they're used to this idea that men should be able to be involved in every decision. But my girlfriend's body is her own. I have no ownership over it.

Finally, do you genuinely see no difference between a "glob of cells" at 13 weeks versus an actual slave? Seriously? In your mind, they're one and the same?

Also, I'm not sure Aaron acquiesced to your side anywhere. Or maybe it was his wife that was refusing to acquiesce at all. I don't remember.

[seeker]

It is hers, and she is free to make whatever decision she feels is right.
We agree here - it's just that the fetus is not part of her body, it has it's own body that she is carrying. Just because you can't see it as a baby doesn't mean it isn't so. It is convenient for us to look the other way, but a helpless person is at risk.

Finally, do you genuinely see no difference between a "glob of cells" at 13 weeks versus an actual slave? Seriously? In your mind, they're one and the same?

You tell me which of these pictures is the one that seems to you that a baby is there that might need protection from harm.
http://www.wprc.org/trimester1.phtml

8 weeks looks pretty convincing to me. And there's a heartbeat at 6. 13 weeks and a slave both look human to me.

[Sam Wilkinson]

Seeker,

If a glob of cells and an adult are the same thing, then surely you must believe in EQUAL treatment for both, right?

Or does equal treatment end at birth?

[seeker]

Did you look at the pictures? Do you call those things at 8 weeks a "blob of cells"?

[Sam Wilkinson]

I have seen the pictures, yes. But I return to my basic point - a woman isn't SIMPLY a vessel for a baby. She is quite a bit more than that. And as such, I don't think this argument can be so quickly resolved. I find it fascinating that while you don't mind telling women what they can and can't do with their bodies, you object to anybody telling you what can and can't be done with other segments of society. Where do you draw the line Seeker? At what point shouldn't the government be involved?

[seeker]

a woman isn't SIMPLY a vessel for a baby. She is quite a bit more than that. And as such, I don't think this argument can be so quickly resolved.

No, you are right, but neither is the unborn fetus a "blob of cells" or a sack of protoplasm. I am not telling her what to do with her body - I am forbidding her to take the life of another human - we already do that with infants, and what she is doing, after a certain point in pregnancy, is infanticide. That's my position, and I think it is defensible, much more than your "if it's in her body, it has no right to life" argument.

The government should be involved to protect life and liberty of all persons. The life of the baby trumps the liberty of the woman, in this case, just like my liberty to speak freely ends when I am slandering you. In this case, though, the woman is taking something much more valuable than a reputation from the child.

I am not controlling anyone's body. I am saving the life of a person whose rights are being taken away because you are arguing that the child is basically the woman's property, with no rights, until it is born.

[Sam Wilkinson]

For someone who believes so deeply in the rights of all people to be treated fairly, how on Earth do you immediately abandon that position when it comes to adults? I just find it strange that while you can muster all of the indignation imaginable for a fetus, you can't find it in your heart to support legal protection for other sorts of situations. Particularly if your benchmark is going to be the suffering of others.

Finally, I have to wonder how you can agree to any abortion at all? Or how can you agree to the life of the mother being protected? I mean, from the way I'm reading it, you should be willing to see your wife die so long as the fetus surives.

[seeker]

For someone who believes so deeply in the rights of all people to be treated fairly, how on Earth do you immediately abandon that position when it comes to adults?
Well, because rights have limits, and must be balanced. For example, what happens when rights conflict? Which one wins? Is my right to life worth more than my right to property? If you destroy my property, is that the same as taking my life?

In the abortion debate, there is no doubt that women, men, and the child all have rights. But I think that the child's right to life trumps the adults' right of choice. In a sense, by becoming pregnant, they have made a choice, and can't go back on it by killing another human, any more than a parent who regrets having children can kill them after they are born.

My rights are limited by your rights. I have free speech, but can't slander you. A woman can choose, but after the child is considered a person with rights, her right to choose is now limited to adoption or parenting, and killing is out.

Finally, I have to wonder how you can agree to any abortion at all?
My complete view is documented at www.c-ral.org.

[Sam Wilkinson]

Seeker,

Well, you're getting down to one of our basest disagreements. Obviously, I don't believe that all pregnancies are "chosen." I don't believe that the act of sex does, or even should, automatically mean that those having sex are "choosing" to get pregnant. (Some) Christians OBVIOUSLY disagree with this, going so far as to clearly believe that pregnancy is a great punishment for those having sex, which one of the many reasons that abortions are opposed. (In the same way that some Christians opposed that cancer vaccine for girls; anything that makes women feel safer about having sex is thus bad.)

However, I propose that we end this. We're not going anywhere.

[seeker]

Obviously, I don't believe that all pregnancies are "chosen." I don't believe that the act of sex does, or even should, automatically mean that those having sex are "choosing" to get pregnant.

Most sex is "chosen", and as the saying goes, "you can choose your actions, but you can't choose your consequences." We want to avoid the consequences of our actions by killing the unborn. It's irresponsible sex that is the problem. And merely trying to short-circuit the natural fruits of our actions may work in the short run, but in the long run, it ruins character, and has other negative, unintended consequences. And two wrongs don't make a right - irresponsible sex can't be made right by following up with killing. It should be followed up by responsible action.

One of the things that Christians rightly criticize is the modern desire to separate sex, children, and marriage. They are meant to go together. Not that we have to have children, but that sex leads to children naturally, and naturally belongs inside marriage.

The desire to separate these is part of what causes many social problems.

People choose to risk pregnancy when they choose to have sex, ergo they chose it even if they didn't want it, and killing a child is not justified.

Are you still claiming that the 8 week old fetus is just a clump of cells? Can you answer that question? Can you defend your answer without trying to divert the question to some other issue? I am skeptical.

[Cineaste]

Are you still claiming that the 8 week old fetus is just a clump of cells?

Not a human being yet though. You are still talking about potential at this point (see article above for clarification). As a side note, how do creationists explain the tail that embryos develop? ID?

They (8 week old fetus') have a heartbeat and brainwaves, and perhaps additionally, are able to widthdraw from negative stimuli, that is a good enough argument that they respond to what amounts to pain, and should be protected by law. -Seeker

Fish have these properties. Should fish be protected by law?

Sex leads to children naturally, and naturally belongs inside marriage.

How did you come to the conclusion that sex and children "naturally" belong inside marriage? Lets see some evidence.

[seeker]

Fish have these properties. Should fish be protected by law?
No, because fish aren't humans. However, if a fish has a heartbeat and brainwaves, you would call it a living being. And this baby is a living HUMAN being.

Not a human being yet though.
That is arguable. And based on it's morphology, level of development, and potential at this point, I think we should err on the safe side rather than on some speculative philosophical stance that it is "not human yet." You could make the same type of argument for infants, and it would be just as invalid.

As a side note, how do creationists explain the tail that embryos develop? ID?
Two ways. First of all, if you are trailing out the old "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" canard, that has long been abandoned by reputable scientists, I believe. You can read some common creationist answers the "human tail" argument here and here.

Has the ‘biogenetic law’ any merit? In 1965, evolutionist George Gaylord Simpson said, ‘It is now firmly established that ontogeny does not repeat phylogeny.’ Prof. Keith Thompson (biology, Yale) said:

Surely the biogenetic law is as dead as a doornail. It was finally exorcised from biology textbooks in the fifties. As a topic of serious theoretical inquiry, it was extinct in the twenties.

The most that can be said is that embryos in the same major group (such as the vertebrates, which include fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals) tend to resemble each other at a certain stage before they develop the distinguishing characteristics of their class, genus and species...Although it is true that vertebrate embryos are somewhat similar at one stage of their development, at earlier stages they are radically dissimilar.

How did you come to the conclusion that sex and children "naturally" belong inside marriage? Lets see some evidence.
First of all, I guess you are already accepting the first assumption in my sentence, which is that sex leads to children, generally speaking. Marriage is important becuase it provides a stable, loving environment with consistent role models of each sex for the healthy development of the child. You are correct in assuming that the "case for monogamous marriage" is not easy to make, but I do think it valid.

There is also a biblical principle which I believe is psychologically and sociologically sound - that comittment should precede intimacy. Intimacy without comittment is tantamount to taking what is not yours, reaping benefits that you are not qualified to take, and trying to get something for nothing. In real practice, sex without comittment leads to all kinds of personal and social problems. Just look at all of the fatherless kids in the ghettos (and the suburbs!).

[Cineaste]

No, because fish aren't humans. However, if a fish has a heartbeat and brainwaves, you would call it a living being. And this baby is a living HUMAN being.

Not human at that stage. So, at that stage, how does it differ from a fish? In fact, at 8 weeks, the human fetus looks and acts a lot like a pig fetus.

That is arguable. And based on it's morphology, level of development, and potential at this point, I think we should err on the safe side rather than on some speculative philosophical stance that it is "not human yet." You could make the same type of argument for infants, and it would be just as invalid.

Not arguable. The "potential" argument is invalid. See article. No way can I make the same argument about infants. An infant and a 8 week old fetus are different i.e. the infant is a human being, the 8 week old fetus is not. Show me that an 8 week old fetus is a human being; brainwaves, reaction to stimuli, etc don't cut it because as I mentioned, fish also have these properties.

ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny

Did you know that at one point the fetus/embryo has gills (that funtion)? How about webbed fingers? How does ID explain that? Same way?

First of all, I guess you are already accepting the first assumption in my sentence, which is that sex leads to children, generally speaking.

Yes, I agree with you here.

Marriage is important becuase it provides a stable, loving environment with consistent role models of each sex for the healthy development of the child.

You told me why you feel marriage is important. Now, why do you say it's "natural" that sex and children belong inside marriage?

[seeker]

Not human at that stage.
On what grounds is it "not human"? It is genetically human. It already has human morphology, including fingers and toes, a heart, and eyes, etc. So what if they are not mature? An infant's features aren't mature either. Why do you seek to dehumanize the fetus? Only in order to justify killing it.

the human fetus looks and acts a lot like a pig fetus.
A human baby looks and acts a lot like a simian infant. Yet they are not the same. At what point, then, would you consider the fetus unlike these other creatures, and distinctly human?

An infant and a 8 week old fetus are different i.e. the infant is a human being, the 8 week old fetus is not. Show me that an 8 week old fetus is a human being; brainwaves, reaction to stimuli, etc don't cut it because as I mentioned,

I find this argument specious on two accounts. Firstly, just because two mammals are alive (heartbeat and brainwaves) does not make them of equal value, nor does it make the human not human, nor the other mammal not of it's own species. And just because a fish can respond to stimuli doesn't mean that if a human does the same, it is not human, nor does it mean that the human is a fish! While you don't mean that, your argument pretty much ends up there. It's specious.

And your argument that "less developed means not human" most certainly could be applied to infants, and it would be just as invalid. The question of personhood does not have to do with whether a child is born or not, or viable, nor perhaps even if it has human potentiality. I think that the critical factors that make the fetus a person are:
- is is of human origin
- is is differentiated enough to have the critical organs that are considered to be "human life" at the end of life, specifically, the heartbeat and brainwaves
- it can respond to negative stimuli

While the last point may be extended to include "and feel pain cognitively", though this argument has merit, I reject it because basing personhood on the ability to suffer is incomplete, and assumes too much. But by this argument alone, we should outlaw abortions after 24 weeks.

Did you know that at one point the fetus/embryo has gills (that funtion)? How about webbed fingers? How does ID explain that? Same way?
Yep, those are all common misconceptions, evolutionary imaginings perpetuated by the faithful. They have little to do with real developmental biology or genetics.

In the human embryo at one month, there are wrinkles (flexion folds) in the skin where the "throat pouches" grow out. Once in a while, one of these pouches will break through, and a child will be born with a small hole in the neck. That's when we find out for sure that these structures are not gill slits. If the opening were really part of a gill, if it really were a "throwback to the fish stage," then there would be blood vessels all around it, as if it were going to absorb oxygen from water as a gill does. But there is no such structure. We simply don't have the DNA instructions for forming gills.

The throat (or pharyngeal) grooves and pouches, falsely called "gill slit," are not mistakes in human development. They develop into absolutely essential parts of human anatomy - the lower jaw, tongue, thymus gland, the parathyroid, etc. The middle ear canals come from the second pouches, and the parathyroid and thymus glands come from the third and fourth.

why do you say it's "natural" that sex and children belong inside marriage
What is good for emotional and social development is natural.

[Cineaste]

On what grounds is it "not human"?

See article above. Not human.

Also, pointing out the similarities between a pig and human fetus was to demonstrate that showing pictures of 8 week old fetus'(like you did with Sam) as human looking mean nothing. It's an emotional appeal but without substance.

At what point, then, would you consider the fetus unlike these other creatures, and distinctly human?

Sometime past 8 weeks and before birth. It's impossible to pinpoint but just as you feel the moment of conception does not equate to a human being (though the zygote has all the genetics of a human), I feel that personhood comes later than 8 weeks.

And your argument that "less developed means not human" most certainly could be applied to infants

This is not my argument. It is, brain waves, response to stimuli, etc. do not equal human, nor do they equal fish. They equate to alive, so what? Fish are also alive. The point is, the criteria you use for your 8 week "point of personhood" demonstrate nothing other than "it's alive." "Potential" for becoming a human being is insufficient. It must BE human to have human rights. My point can't be applied to infants. How many people think infants are not human? (none) How many people think an 8 week old embryo/fetus is not yet human? (me and half the country)

- is is of human origin
- is is differentiated enough to have the critical organs that are considered to be "human life" at the end of life, specifically, the heartbeat and brainwaves
- it can respond to negative stimuli

Terri Shaivo met all these qualifications (even brain waves) yet I would say she was not "human" anymore, I would say the "human" in her died long ago and only her body was alive.

Yep, those are all common misconceptions, evolutionary imaginings perpetuated by the faithful.

Ah! So that's why embryos/fetuses were designed with a tail, webbed fingers and gills... Because God wanted it like that. Uhhh huh :)

What is good for emotional and social development is natural.

Right! Because we all know animals get married so it's natural. I am submitting the above quote to the website, "Fundies say the darndest things." http://www.fstdt.com/

[seeker]

I feel that personhood comes later than 8 weeks.
I have provided logical criteria. Unless you do the same, I'd say that my position is more defensible.

They equate to alive, so what? Fish are also alive.
So alive humans don't have any worth to you? What other criteria would you invoke?

Ah! So that's why embryos/fetuses were designed with a tail, webbed fingers and gills
NO, because those are wishful evolutionary misinterpretations of the morphology, which has little to do with their function or genetics.

Right! Because we all know animals get married so it's natural.
Humans are not animals, but moral beings. Would you like human society to work like chimp society? My argument stands. What is good for emotional development and social development is natural and intended, and therefore, also ethically and morally defensible.

[Cineaste]

I have provided logical criteria.

...that fish are alive and embryos are alive. For logical criteria of my position, I refer you to the artcle above.

So alive humans don't have any worth to you?

Lots of worth, too bad 8 week old fetus' have less cognitive ability than a fish and are not human, just as you don't consider a 2 week old embryo human.

wishful evolutionary misinterpretations of the morphology

You meant wishful creationist misrepresentations.

sex and children "naturally" belong inside marriage?

Are you are being purposfully dense again like with your inability to infer I have a heart without experimenting? I'll try to help you along. Think about how often you see marriage in nature. What? Not at all? It's not "natural" then is it? It's a human social and legal construct right? See, what this means Seeker is, marriage is not natural.

Humans are not animals, but moral beings.

Humans are animals with differing moralities.

Would you like human society to work like chimp society?

If the moon were made of cheese, would you eat it?